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Abstract
In many globalized industries, vertical outsourcing seems to co-evolve
with horizontal integration in the component sector. In order to account
for this phenomenon, I incorporate modularity into an industry-equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition and perfect contracts that allows the
organization of the ﬁrm to be endogenous in both the vertical and horizontal
dimensions of production. The model illustrates that the co-evolution is most
likely to occur in industries with modular product architectures and high
increasing returns to scale in the intermediate good sector. This paper also
provides a theoretical legitimation of Stigler’s contentious conjecture that
ﬁrm production structures become vertically disintegrated as an industry
expands.
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1Introduction
The last few decades have seen an unprecedented reorganization of inter-
national production. In many industries, production has become increas-
ingly disintegrated as multinational ﬁrms have fragmented their production
process and set up subsidiaries across borders (Feenstra and Hanson 1996;
Campa and Goldberg 1997; Feenstra 1998; Hummels, Ishii and Yi 2001). At
the same time, the boundaries of the multinational ﬁrms have been chang-
ing, with cross-border vertical outsourcing (Antras and Helpman, 2003) and
horizontal mergers and acquisitions on the rise (Evenett, 2003).
Case studies from a variety of industries have indicated that the trend
of vertical outsourcing and horizontal integration in international production
might be related. Sturgeon (2001) and Sturgeon and Lee (2001), for example,
document that the recent trend by brand-name electronics ﬁrms to replace
in-house manufacturing with outsourced manufacturing has co-evolved with a
consolidation of market shares by the ﬁve largest ﬁrms in the contract manu-
facturing industry. Similar trends have been found in other global industries
such as semiconductors (Langlois and Steinmueller 1999), telecommunica-
tions (Li and Whalley 2002), automobiles (Sturgeon and Florida 2000) and
pharmaceuticals (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella 2001).
A detailed review of the existing literature reveals that, to date, no the-
oretical studies have addressed the co-evolution of vertical outsourcing and
horizontal integration. As Sturgeon (2001) indicates, to neglect this link
might lead to the erroneous characterization of the vertical outsourcing pro-
cess as one where industries necessarily evolve toward smaller ﬁrms. The
goal of this paper is to ﬁll the gap in the existing literature by providing a
theoretical framework that can explain the co-evolution.
In order to do so, I build on two separate streams of literature - inter-
national trade and management - that focus on the relative prevalence of
vertical integration versus outsourcing. An emerging international trade lit-
erature has studied the impact of market characteristics on the boundaries
of the ﬁrm by incorporating transaction costs and imperfect competition
2into industry-equilibrium models. Among them, Konan (2000) developed a
perfect-contract model with two imperfectly competitive vertical layers of
production. In her model, a ﬁrm’s decision to internationally outsource is
determined by the trade-oﬀ between the high ﬁxed cost of vertical integration
and the high marginal cost of trading at arm’s length due to double marginal-
ization. Konan ﬁnds that a decrease in market power in the intermediate
goods sector reduces the double marginalization cost of arm’s length trade
and thus induces outsourcing. McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman
(2002a, 2002b) focus on the importance of contracts on the organization of
international production. In their models, ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between
the friction of incomplete contracts in arm’s length relationships and excess
governance costs in integrated companies. McLaren ﬁnds that a ”thicker”
intermediate good market reduces the hold-up problem that intermediate
good ﬁrms face and thus induces outsourcing. Grossman and Helpman ﬁnd
that an increase in industry size and a better contracting environment favor
outsourcing. The impact of competition on the vertical boundaries of the
ﬁrm was ambiguous however.
Unlike the trade literature, the management literature has focused more
on the role of product characteristics on the organization of production. In
particular, a large number of studies have analyzed the link between mod-
ularity in product design and the boundaries of the ﬁrm. Sanchez and Ma-
honey (1996), for example, argue that modularity in product design induces
outsourcing, because the standardized component interfaces in a modular
product architecture reduce the coordination cost of trading at arm’s length.
Sturgeon (2002) adds that modularity is even more likely to induce out-
sourcing if the outsourced production stages face increasing returns. This is
because component producers can then move down their average cost curve
by applying the same set of standard production routines for various clients.
Schilling (2000), ﬁnally, links industry standards to the boundaries of the
ﬁrm. She argues that industry-wide standardization - de facto as well as
regulatory - makes the interrelation between components less speciﬁc, thus
3increasing modularity and providing incentives to ﬁrms to outsource.
In this paper, I incorporate modularity into an industry-equilibrium model
with monopolistic competition and perfect contracts to explain the co-evolution
of vertical outsourcing and horizontal integration in international production.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 deﬁnes modularity and explains
how the concept is incorporated into the model. The model is then formalized
in Section 2 and the two basic cost trade-oﬀs that determine the equilibrium
organization of production are identiﬁed. In the remaining sections, the
model is solved and concluding remarks are provided.
1 Product Modularity
A ﬁnal product can be seen as a set of components that interact with one
another according to the rules of its product architecture (Ulrich, 1995).
Product architectures can vary on a continuum from integral to modular
(Schilling, 2000; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). When a product has an
integral architecture, components are speciﬁcally adjusted to each other to
fully elicit the potential performance of the ﬁnal product. As a result of
this speciﬁcity, replacement of a component by another variety signiﬁcantly
reduces the functionality of the ﬁnal product. In contrast, components in a
modular architecture are designed to interact with each other according to
codiﬁed architectural standards. As a result, components can be substituted
with little loss of functionality as long as their substitutes are compatible
with these standards.
As in Schilling (2000), industry-wide standardization (both de facto stan-
dardization and regulatory standardization) of architectural rules increases
the degree of modularity of a product. This is because standardization of
component interlinkages reduces the speciﬁcity of the relationship between
components as they are now required to interact through stricter industry-
wide rules. As a consequence, substitution of components leads to a smaller
loss in overall functionality and the product becomes more modular.
4An important contribution of this paper is the incorporation of modu-
larity into an industry equilibrium model of international production. To
capture input speciﬁcity, I associate each ﬁnal product with an ideal com-
ponent (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). If a component is ideal, then the
ﬁnal good producer can incorporate the intermediate good in ﬁnal good pro-
duction without bearing mismatch costs. However, if the intermediate is
not fully specialized (i.e. not fully compatible), mismatch costs arise. The
ﬁnal good producer must then pay additional units of labor to make the
intermediate good compatible to the ﬁnal good.
For simplicity, I assume that intermediate and ﬁnal goods are located on
two separate concentric circles. In particular, all ﬁnal goods are symmetri-
cally and uniformly distributed along the circumference of a unit circle. All
intermediate goods, on the other hand, are arrayed along the circumference
of a concentric circle of length γ, with γ ranging from 0 to ∞. As we shall
elaborate on below, γ determines the degree of modularity in an industry.
An intermediate good is ideal for a ﬁnal good if they both lie on the
same ray. If they do not lie on the same ray, then mismatch cost sδ arises,
where s equals the wage rate and δ equals the intermediate good circle’s
arc distance between the actual position of the intermediary good and the
position of the ideal intermediary good. An example is considered in ﬁgure 1.
For illustration, γ is smaller than one, implying that the intermediate good
circle is smaller than the ﬁnal good circle. There are four ﬁnal good ﬁrms x1
to x4. The ideal intermediate good for x1 is z1, and the ideal intermediate
good for x2 is z2. Suppose that ﬁnal good ﬁrm x1 decides to use the non-ideal
intermediate good z3 to produce the ﬁnal good. In that case, the ﬁnal good
ﬁrm faces mismatch cost sδ, where δ equals the arc distance between z1 and
z3.
While ﬁnal good producers are uniformly distributed along the circum-
ference of the unit circle, intermediate good producers can choose where to
position themselves on the intermediate good circle. As a result, mismatch
costs are endogenous in the model. Final good ﬁrms will only bear the mis-
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Figure 1: Locations of ﬁnal and intermediate good suppliers
match cost of using a non-ideal component if the price of that component
after adjustment for mismatch costs is cheaper than that of its ideal com-
ponent. Under constant returns to scale in the intermediate good sector,
this cannot occur in this model. If intermediate good ﬁrms face increasing
returns to scale, however, mismatch costs can endogenously arise as the in-
termediate good ﬁrms can move down their average cost curves by selling
a standardized component to multiple ﬁnal good producers. For symmetry
purposes, I take on the strong assumption that an intermediate good ﬁrm
can sell a standardized component to at most two ﬁnal good producers. This
implies that the mismatch cost that each ﬁnal good ﬁrm faces in industry





0 if all ﬁrms use ideal components
sγ
2n if all ﬁrms use standardized components
The amount of mismatch costs that a ﬁnal good ﬁrm faces if it uses
6standardized components thus depends on three factors: (1) the number of
ﬁnal good ﬁrms n, (2) the wages that the ﬁnal good ﬁrm faces s and (3) the
degree of modularity γ.1
I have deﬁned γ as the degree of modularity for the following reason. If,
all else equal, γ decreases, then the distance between component varieties
becomes smaller, thus making the varieties closer substitutes to each other.
This characteristic of γ strongly resembles that of modularity. Once again,
take ﬁgure 1 as an example. Suppose the intermediate good circle becomes
smaller due to an increase in γ. In that case, the ﬁnal good producers x1
and x2 would need to pay less mismatch costs to use z1 in their ﬁnal good
production.
2 Model Setup
Consider a world with two regions, Home and Foreign, and one industry
that produces diﬀerentiated consumer goods. The industry in both regions
is assumed to be suﬃciently small in relation to the rest of the economy, so
that the industry can hire as much labor as it wishes at ﬁxed wages. Wages
at home s are higher than wages abroad w∗. The production structure in
the industry consists of two vertical layers of production that are fragmented
across borders. The intermediate good sector z is concentrated abroad, while
the ﬁnal good sector x is concentrated at home.
In the intermediate goods sector z, ﬁrms face increasing returns to scale
and produce diﬀerentiated inputs. In the ﬁnal goods sector x, ﬁrms compete
in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition market and produce diﬀeren-
tiated ﬁnal goods. As in Konan (2000), this setup of successive stages of
production with increasing returns to scale technologies creates a ﬁrst cost
trade-oﬀ that endogenizes the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm in industry equi-
librium. If ﬁnal good ﬁrms outsource, they face a high marginal cost due to
1Since our model applies largely to industry or economy-wide phenomena and not to
the ﬁrm, ignoring the integer problem will not be important issue here.
7”double marginalization” (Spengler, 1950) but do not need to pay the ﬁxed
cost of setting up an international subsidiary. If the ﬁnal good ﬁrms decide
to set up a subsidiary, they internalize the double marginalization distortion,
but need to spend the additional ﬁxed cost to set up the subsidiary. The
trade-oﬀ will determine whether ﬁrms will be vertically integrated or will
outsource in industry equilibrium.
The assumptions of increasing returns to scale in the intermediate good
sector and input speciﬁcity create a second cost trade-oﬀ that endogenizes
the horizontal boundaries of the intermediate good ﬁrms under outsourcing.
In particular, it determines whether an intermediate good ﬁrm provides an
ideal component to one ﬁnal good producer or whether it consolidates its
market share by providing a non-ideal standardized component to two ﬁnal
good producers. Ideal Outsourcing eliminates mismatch costs, but leaves the
intermediate good ﬁrms with a high average cost. Standardized Outsourcing
allows the intermediate good ﬁrm to move down its average cost curve, but
leads to mismatch costs.
The two cost-tradeoﬀs allow me to distinguish three production structure
regimes (see ﬁgure 2). Under Vertical Integration, vertically integrated ﬁrms
produce both the intermediate good and the ﬁnal good. Under Ideal Out-
sourcing, production of intermediate goods is outsourced to external ﬁrms
that produce ideal components. Under Standardized Outsourcing, produc-
tion of intermediate goods is outsourced to external ﬁrms that provide a
standardized component to multiple ﬁnal good producers.
The equilibrium production structure is determined by a two-step proce-
dure. In step one, ﬁrms in both markets choose from the three production
structures to produce consumer goods. As shown in ﬁgure 3, they do so
in a non-cooperative game with ordered moves and perfect information. At
decision node h.1, each domestic ﬁnal goods ﬁrm take the existing industry
structure as given and decides whether to commit to x production. If a home
ﬁrm chooses not to produce x, then the game is over and both the home ﬁrm
and the foreign ﬁrm that links itself to the home ﬁrm receive zero proﬁts. If
87
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Figure 2: Three Production Structures
the ﬁnal goods producer commits to x production, then it needs to decide at
node h.2 whether to produce intermediate good z itself (vertical integration)
or to purchase z at arm’s length from a foreign ﬁrm (outsourcing). If Verti-
cal Integration is chosen, then the home ﬁrm receives monopoly proﬁts πV I
x
and the foreign ﬁrm that links itself to that home ﬁrm receives zero proﬁts.
If instead at node h.2, the home ﬁrm decides to import z at arm’s length,
then the foreign ﬁrm enters the game. At node f.1, the foreign ﬁrm decides
whether to produce intermediate good z. Without foreign z production the
game ends with the home ﬁrm’s loss of its ﬁxed cost (-F) and a zero foreign
ﬁrm proﬁt. If the foreign ﬁrm decide to produce z, it needs to decide at node
f.2 which variety of the ﬁnal good to supply. Ideal Outsourcing will be the
outcome if the intermediate good producer decides to produce an ideal vari-
ety for a domestic ﬁnal good producer. Standardized Outsourcing will be the
outcome if he chooses to supply a standardized variety. Home and foreign
ﬁrms choose the production structure that maximizes their proﬁts given the
existing industry structure.
In step two, the ﬁrms select the proﬁt maximizing price and quantity
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Figure 3: Three Production Structures
3 Monopolistic Competition Model
The ﬁnal good producers act in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition
setting. Consumers spend a constant fraction β of their income on output
from the industry. They view the varieties produced by the industry as
symmetrically diﬀerentiated and perceive a constant elasticity of substitution
between every pair of goods. A standard result in this kind of setting is that















On the supply side, ﬁrms make decisions in two steps. In the ﬁrst step,
ﬁrms decide on their production structure. Vertically, ﬁnal good produc-
ers x decide between vertical integration and outsourcing and, horizontally,
intermediate good producers z decide between producing standardized or
idealized components. In the second step, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts given
the production structure chosen in stage one. The model is solved through
backward induction.
3.1 Vertical Integration
In stage 2, ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts given the production structure chosen
in stage 1. I start oﬀ by assuming that all ﬁrms are vertically integrated (V I).
In that case, each ﬁnal good producer chooses to produce the intermediate
good z himself. He naturally chooses to produce the ideal component because
he does not want to bear a self-imposed mismatch cost. The ﬁnal goods
producer thus faces the following proﬁt function:
π
V I
x = [px(X) − s − w
∗ − τz]x − (F + Gx) (4)
where the marginal cost of production includes domestic wages s induced
during ﬁnal good production, foreign wages w∗ induced during component
production, and transportation costs and/or tariﬀs τz induced during the
transportation of the intermediate good from foreign to home. The ﬁxed
cost of V I production includes the ﬁxed cost of setting up a ﬁnal good ﬁrm
at home F and the ﬁxed cost of setting up a subsidiary for component pro-
duction Gx abroad.
The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition of optimization provides the stan-
dard Dixit-Stiglitz result that the price-marginal-cost mark-up depends only








∗ + τz) (5)
By plugging the pricing equation (??) and the demand function (??) into
the proﬁt function (??), the expected proﬁt function of a vertically integrated








1−σ − (F + Gx) (6)
The zero-proﬁt condition now allows the determination of the equilibrium






which implies that the number of ﬁnal good ﬁrms is increasing in βE,
decreasing in σ and decreasing in ﬁxed costs.
˜ x
V I =
(F + Gx)(σ − 1)
s + w∗ + τz
(8)
This implies that the scale of ﬁrm output is increasing in the ratio of
ﬁxed to marginal cost, and increasing in the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. Changes in any other demand side parameters such as β and E
lead to adjustments in industry output via changes in the number of ﬁrms
only.
3.2 Ideal Outsourcing
If the equilibrium production structure is Ideal Outsourcing (IO), the pro-
duction of the intermediate component is outsourced to an external ﬁrm
that produces the ideal component. Because the model does not allow for
economies of scope, the intermediate good ﬁrm can only provide ideal in-
termediate goods to one ﬁnal good ﬁrm. As a result, in an IO equilibrium
there are an equal number of intermediate and ﬁnal good ﬁrms and no ﬁ-
nal good ﬁrm bears mismatch costs. In this production structure, the proﬁt
12maximization conditions need to be solved for both the intermediate good
producer and the ﬁnal good producer.
I start with the optimization decision of intermediate good producers.
The proﬁt function for the IO intermediate good producer is:
πz = Pz(Z)z − w
∗z − Gz (9)
where Gz is the ﬁxed cost of setting up an intermediate good ﬁrm z. The







z is the intermediate good markup under ideal outsourcing.
The ﬁnal good producer faces the following proﬁt function:
π
IO
x = [px(X) − s − Pz − τz]x − F (11)
By plugging the pricing equation (??) into (??)
π
IO
x = [px(X) − s − µ
IO
z w
∗ − τz]x − F (12)
The proﬁt function for the ﬁnal good producer under ideal outsourcing
diﬀers from the proﬁt function under vertical integration in two important
ways. On the one hand, the IO ﬁnal good producer now faces a lower ﬁxed
cost than under V I as he does not incur the ﬁxed cost Gx of setting up a
subsidiary. On the other hand, the IO ﬁnal good producer faces a higher
marginal cost than under V I as he has to pay an extra markup µIO
z to
purchase the intermediate good. As mentioned above, this is the crucial
tradeoﬀ that determines the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm in this model.
The rest of the analysis is similar to vertical integration. If I set the











∗ + τz) (13)
By plugging the pricing equation (??) and the demand function (??) into











1−σ − F (14)
With free entry, total proﬁts amount to zero. Thus the break-even con-






Finally, sales per brand amount to (??), or using the price equation and





z w∗ + τz
(16)
3.3 Standardized Outsourcing
Under standardized outsourcing (SO), intermediate good ﬁrms sell a stan-
dardized intermediate good z to multiple ﬁnal good producers. In order to
preserve symmetry in the ﬁnal goods sector, I assume that the intermedi-
ate good producer can sell a standardized component to maximum two ﬁnal
good producers. This implies that, in a SO equilibrium, there are twice as
many ﬁnal good ﬁrms than intermediate good ﬁrms and each ﬁnal good ﬁrm
bears mismatch costs sδ equal to
sγ
2n.
Intermediate good producers face the same proﬁt function as under Ideal
Outsourcing and the proﬁt maximization condition (??) also continues to
hold. The proﬁt function for the SO ﬁnal goods producer is:
π
SO






∗ − τz]x − F (17)
14The proﬁt function of the ﬁnal good producer under SO bears a lot
of similarities with the proﬁt function under IO: the ﬁnal good producer
faces no subsidiary setup cost Gx, but faces a markup µSO
z above w∗. An
important diﬀerence is that under standardized outsourcing the ﬁnal good
producer has to spend resources
sγ
2n to make the standardized input suitable
for the ﬁnal good. As mentioned above, this provides the second trade-
oﬀ that determines the horizontal boundaries of the intermediate good ﬁrm
under outsourcing. The ﬁnal good producer will only prefer to bear the
mismatch cost of purchasing standardized components if the marginal cost
of SO is lower than the marginal cost of IO. This can only occur if the
intermediate good markup µSO
z is suﬃciently lower than the intermediate
good markup µIO
z . Given the fact that the intermediate good ﬁrm operates
under increasing returns to scale, this is plausible because the intermediate
good ﬁrm can move down his average cost curve by selling his components
to more ﬁnal good producers.
The rest of this section is similar to above. If I set marginal revenue equal














By plugging the pricing equation (??) and the demand function (??) into














1−σ − F (19)
With free entry, total proﬁts amount to zero. Thus the break-even con-




















Finally, sales per brand amount to (??), or using the price equation and









4 Industry Equilibrium Determination
In the previous section I have solved for the proﬁt maximizing price and
output in the three market structures. In stage one, I solve for the equilibrium
production structure by using the following approach: production structure
i is the equilibrium production structure if and only if it is unproﬁtable for
ﬁrms with another production structure to enter the market.
4.1 Determination of Vertical Firm Boundaries
I start oﬀ with determining the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm. In do so by
focusing on the conditions under which vertical integration is the equilibrium
production structure. Vertical integration acts as a stable equilibrium if and
only if it is unproﬁtable for ﬁrms to enter with an IO or SO production
structure.
Suppose ﬁrst that a pair of ﬁrms with an IO production structure at-
tempts to enter a market that is pervasively vertically integrated. In that
case, the IO ﬁnal good ﬁrm faces the same demand AV I as the other verti-
cally integrated ﬁrms with
˜ A
V I = σ
σ(σ − 1)
1−σ(F + Gx)(s + w
∗ + τz)
σ−1 (23)
Facing V I demand, the IO ﬁnal good ﬁrm then maximizes proﬁts by
setting its price according to (??). With this price, the IO ﬁnal goods ﬁrm
makes sales for:
16˜ x





(σ − 1)(F + Gx)(s + w∗ + τz)σ−1
(s + µIO
z w∗ + τz)σ (24)
His operating proﬁts are:
˜ π
IO
x = (F + Gx)
 s + w∗ + τz
s + µIO
z w∗ + τz
σ−1
− F (25)
An IO ﬁnal good ﬁrm will decide not to enter the market if its operating
proﬁts are negative. This implies that the ﬁrst necessary condition for a
vertical integration equilibrium is:
 s + w∗ + τz
s + µIO




A parallel analysis show that ﬁrms with a SO production structure are
deterred to enter if:
 s + w∗ + τz
s + µSO






The combination of (??) and (??) leads to the ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists an equilibrium with pervasive vertical integra-






V I ≤ 1
where RMCV I is the relative marginal cost of vertical integration versus
(both kinds of) outsourcing and RFCV I is the relative ﬁxed cost of vertical
integration versus (both kinds of) outsourcing.
Proposition 1 provides the general condition that determines the vertical
boundaries of the ﬁrm. It states that vertical integration becomes more likely
if the marginal cost of vertical integration relative to that of both kinds of
outsourcing decreases, if the ﬁxed cost of vertical integration relative to that
of outsourcing goes down, and if the weight of marginal costs relative to ﬁxed
17costs, measured by scaling factor σ, goes up. The latter is because vertical
integration is the low-marginal cost high-ﬁxed cost production structure.
The proposition together with (??) and (??) also provides the speciﬁc
market and product determinants of the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm.
First, it passes the two basic checks by showing that an increase in the ﬁxed
cost of setting up a subsidiary Gx induces outsourcing, while an increase in
the intermediate good markups µIO
z and µSO
z induces vertical integration.
Second, it replicates Grossman and Helpman’s (2002) result that the im-
pact of competition on the production structure is ambiguous. The degree
of competition is often measured with the elasticity of substitution σ. On
the one hand, an increase in ﬁnal good sector competition σ induces vertical
integration because it increases the weight of relative marginal cost versus
relative ﬁxed cost. This is because an increase in σ increases the level of
output of each ﬁrm. On the other hand, an increase in σ is likely to also
lower the markup on the intermediate good µz because intermediate good
ﬁrms also start producing more, thus moving down their average cost curves.
The decrease in the intermediate good markup µ favors outsourcing. As a
result, the impact of competition on the production structure is ambiguous.
An important question in economic theory is the impact of an increase in
industry demand on the equilibrium production structure. In a seminal pa-
per, Stigler (1951) argued that ﬁrm production structures become vertically
disintegrated as an industry expands. The modern literature on outsourcing
has not been very supportive to the Stigler conjecture however. As sur-
veyed by Perry (1989), standard theory commonly asserts that ﬁrms become
vertically integrated as the industry grows, not vertically disintegrated. By
making a distinction between ideal outsourcing and standardized outsourc-
ing, my model provides further insights into this puzzle. It shows that an
increase in industry demand does not induce ideal outsourcing, but does
induce standardized outsourcing. The reason is the following. Due to the as-
sumption of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition in the ﬁnal goods sector,
the rise in industry demand βE leaves the ﬁrm level of output x unchanged
18while increasing the number of ﬁrms n. The increase in the number of ﬁrms
in this model reduces the equilibrium mismatch cost because the symmetri-
cally distributed ﬁrms move closer to one another on the circle. As a result,
this reduces the SO marginal cost and induces standardized outsourcing.
An important contribution of this paper is that it allows me to study
the impact of product characteristics on the equilibrium boundaries of the
ﬁrm. In particular, my model shows that an increase in modularity induces
standardized outsourcing. The reason is that, all else equal, a decrease in γ
reduces the mismatch cost of adopting a non-ideal variety, thus favoring the
adoption of a standardized component.
Finally, it is diﬃcult to determine the impact of an increase in trans-
portation costs (or tariﬀs) τz, domestic wages s, foreign wages w∗ and ﬁxed
cost F on the relative costs of outsourcing because it is likely to alter the
intermediate good markup µz. In order to determine the eﬀect, I need to
endogenize the intermediate good markup. I will do so in section 5.
4.2 Determinants of the Horizontal Firm Boundaries
I now determine when ideal outsourcing is the equilibrium production struc-
ture. Ideal outsourcing acts as a stable equilibrium if it is unproﬁtable for
ﬁrms to enter with an SO or VI production structure. By using the same
technique as above, I come up with the following results:
There exists an equilibrium with pervasive ideal outsourcing if and only
if
s + µIO
z w∗ + τz
s + w∗ + τz
σ−1 Fs
Fs + Gxw∗ ≤ 1 (28)
and
 s + µIO
z w∗ + τz
s + µSO





Condition (??) is identical to (??), while condition (??) determines the
prevalence of ideal outsourcing versus standardized outsourcing. This leads
19to the second proposition:





Proposition 2 provides the condition that determines the horizontal bound-
aries of the ﬁrm. It conﬁrms that ideal outsourcing can only be an equilibrium
if the ﬁnal good producer perceives that the marginal cost of ideal outsourc-
ing is lower than the marginal cost of standardized outsourcing. This will be
the case if the intermediate good markup of standardized outsourcing µSO
z is
not too much lower than the intermediate good markup of ideal outsourcing
µIO
z , so that it does not dominate the mismatch cost.
Proposition 2 together with (??) show that standardized outsourcing is
more likely to occur in industries with low mismatch costs and high increasing
returns to scale in the intermediate goods sector.
5 Markup Endogenization
Many of the comparative statics in the previous section could not be derived
because the impact of these variables on the intermediate good markup had
not been determined. In this section, I endogenize the intermediate good
markup by assuming contestable markets in the intermediate goods sector.
5.1 Ideal Outsourcing
In an ideal outsourcing equilibrium, the output of the intermediate good ﬁrm





z w∗ + τz
(30)
20If I combine the pricing equation (??) with the output equation (??) and





w∗F(σ − 1) + Gz(s + τz)
w∗[F(σ − 1) − Gz]
(31)
Note that this provides the requirement that F(σ − 1) − Gz > 0. If that
condition holds, then the markup is always larger than 1. If it does not hold,
then intermediate good ﬁrms will not produce in equilibrium. As expected,
the markup is unambiguously increasing in the ﬁxed cost of setting up an
intermediate good ﬁrm Gz. It is also increasing in s and τz while decreasing
in w∗, F and σ. Except for w∗, this is entirely due to the output eﬀect: if the
level of output goes up, then the ﬁxed cost is spread over more units of output
and the markup declines. An increase in w∗ decreases the intermediate good
markup even though output goes down because the positive revenue eﬀect of
an increase in w∗ is larger than the marginal cost eﬀect.




σF(s + τz + w∗)
F(σ − 1) − Gz
(32)
Sales per ﬁrm are then:
˜ x
IO =
F(σ − 1) − Gz
s + w∗ + τz
(33)
As before, this implies that the scale of ﬁnal ﬁrm output is increasing in
the ratio of the ﬁnal good ﬁrm’s ﬁxed to marginal cost, and increasing in the
elasticity of substitution between varieties. An addition to before is that an
increase in the ﬁxed costs of intermediate good production Gz now leads to a
reduction in ﬁnal good output. The mechanism through which this happens
is a higher intermediate good markup.
215.2 Standardized Outsourcing
In a standardized outsourcing equilibrium, the output of the intermediate










This equation states that output of the intermediate good ﬁrm in a stan-
dardized outsourcing equilibrium is increasing in F, σ and s. It is decreasing
in µz, w∗, τz and δ . If I plug the pricing equation (??) and the output
equation (??) into the proﬁt function (??) and set proﬁts equal to zero due




2w∗F(σ − 1) + Gz(s +
sγσF
2βE + τz)
w∗(2F(σ − 1) − Gz)
(35)
Note that this provides the requirement that 2Fs(σ−1)−Gz > 0. If that
condition holds, then the markup is always larger than 1. Just like above,
the markup is increasing in Gz, s and τz and decreasing in F, σ and w∗
due to the output eﬀect. In addition, an increase in industry demand βE
reduces the intermediate good markup. Note that this provides an additional
channel through which an increase in industry demand induces standardized
outsourcing.




2σF(s + τz + w∗ +
sγσF
2βE )
2F(σ − 1) − Gz
(36)
Sales per ﬁrm is then:
˜ x
SO =
2F(σ − 1) − Gz




As before, this implies that the scale of ﬁnal ﬁrm output is increasing
in the ratio of ﬁxed to marginal cost, and increasing in the elasticity of
substitution between varieties. In addition to before, an increase in the ﬁxed
22costs of intermediate good production Gz now leads to a reduction in ﬁnal
good output. Interestingly, an increase in βE increases output, while an
increase in γ reduces output.
6 Industry Equilibrium Determination
6.1 Determinants of the Vertical Firm Boundaries
Vertical integration acts as a stable equilibrium if and only if it is unproﬁtable
for ﬁrms to enter with an IO or SO production structure. Two conditions
need to hold for vertical integration to be a stable equilibrium:







(s + w∗ + τz)(2F(σ − 1) − Gz)
(s + τz + w∗ +
sγσF





The two inequalities conﬁrm the results from above. An increase in the
ﬁxed cost of setting up a subsidiary Gx induces outsourcing. The impact
of competition σ on the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm is ambiguous. An
increase in industry demand βE and an increase in modularity through a
decrease in γ favors standardized outsourcing.
The inequalities also provide new determinants of the vertical boundaries
of the ﬁrm. First, an increase in the ﬁxed cost of setting up an intermediate
good ﬁrm Gz for obvious reasons induces vertical integration.
Second, an increase in the ﬁxed cost of setting up a ﬁnal good ﬁrm F has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm. This is because
an increase in F on the one hand reduces the relative ﬁxed cost of of vertical
integration. On the other hand, it increases the output of intermediate good
ﬁrms, thus reducing their intermediate good markups and thus increasing
the relative marginal cost of vertical integration.
23Interestingly enough, a change of s, τz and w∗ have no impact on the
choice between vertical integration and ideal outsourcing, because the various
eﬀects exactly cancel each other out. They do have an impact on the choice
between vertical integration and standardized outsourcing. An increase in
τz and w∗ reduces the relative marginal cost of standardized outsourcougn
and thus induces standardized outsourcing. An increase in s, on the other
hand, increases the mismatch cost for ﬁnal good producers. As a result, the
relative marginal cost of standardized outsourcing goes up, thus inducing
vertical integration.
6.2 Determinants of the Horizontal Firm Boundaries
In order to determine the horizontal boundaries of the ﬁrm, I need to deter-
mine when ideal outsourcing is preferred to standardized outsourcing. The
following condition determines when ideal outsourcing is preferred to stan-
dardized outsourcing:
 s + w∗ + τz
s + w∗ + τz +
sγσF
2βE
 2F(σ − 1) − Gz
2(F(σ − 1) − Gz)

≤1 (40)
The condition reiterates that an increase in modularity (decrease in γ)
and an increase in industry demand βE induces standardized outsourcing.
It also conﬁrms that an increase in tariﬀ τz and an increase in w∗ reduces the
relative marginal cost of standardized outsourcing, thus inducing standard-
ized outsourcing. An increase in s, on the other hand, increases mismatch
costs that ﬁnal good producers need to pay, thus inducing ideal outsourcing.
An increase in the ﬁnal good ﬁrm ﬁxed cost F favors ideal outsourcing
to standardized outsourcing. The reason is that an increase in F reduces the
number of ﬁnal good ﬁrms in industry equilibrium, thus increasing the mis-
match cost of standardized outsourcing. An increase in intermediate good
ﬁrm ﬁxed cost Gz, on the other hand, induces standardized outsourcing,
because it increases the intermediate good markup under standardized out-
sourcing less than that under ideal outsourcing. Finally, an increase in σ once
24again has an ambiguous impact on the horizontal boundaries of the ﬁrm.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain why in many glob-
alized industries vertical outsourcing co-evolves with horizontal integration
in the intermediate good sector. Speciﬁcally, I build an industry-equilibrium
model with monopolistic competition and perfect contracts that allows the
organization of the ﬁrm to be endogenous in both the vertical and horizon-
tal dimensions of production. In this model, the vertical boundaries of the
ﬁrm are determined by the trade-oﬀ between the high marginalization cost
of outsourcing and the high ﬁxed cost of vertical integration. The horizon-
tal boundaries of the ﬁrm in the intermediate good sector are determined
by the trade-oﬀ between the high average cost of ideal outsourcing and the
high mismatch cost of standardized outsourcing. The two cost trade-oﬀs
allow to distinguish three production structure regimes. Under Vertical In-
tegration, vertically integrated ﬁrms produce both the intermediate good
and the ﬁnal good. Under Ideal Outsourcing, production of intermediate
goods is outsourced to external ﬁrms that produce ideal components. Under
Standardized Outsourcing, production of intermediate goods is outsourced
to external ﬁrms that provide a standardized component to multiple ﬁnal
good producers.
The equilibrium production structure depends endogenously on the pa-
rameters of the model. If an industry moves from Vertical Integration to
Standardized Outsourcing, then a co-evolution in vertical outsourcing and
horizontal integration occurs. The model illustrates that this is likely to oc-
cur in six circumstances: if products become more modular; if the ﬁxed cost
of setting up an intermediate good ﬁrm increases; if tariﬀs and/or transporta-
tion costs increase; if Southern wages increase; if Northern wages decrease;
and if industry demand increases. A change in the degree of competition and
in the ﬁxed cost of setting up a ﬁnal good ﬁrm, on the other hand, has an
25ambiguous impact on the organization of production.
The fact that an increase in industry demand induces standardized out-
sourcing is particularly noteworthy, as it provides a theoretical legitimation
of Stiglers contentious conjecture that ﬁrm production structures become
vertically disintegrated as an industry expands. This result is driven by the
assumption of Dixit- Stiglitz monopolistic competition in the ﬁnal goods sec-
tor. A rise in industry demand increases the number of ﬁnal good ﬁrms
while leaving ﬁrm output unchanged. The increase in the number of ﬁnal
good ﬁrms reduces the equilibrium mismatch cost of adapting standardized
intermediate goods and thus induces standardized outsourcing.
In summary, the model helps to better appreciate the complexity of trade
and investment in a world in which ﬁrms choose endogenously their orga-
nizational forms. Future extensions to the theoretical model are to allow
intermediate good ﬁrms to produce standardized components to more than
two ﬁnal good producers and to introduce incomplete contracts.
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